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Effective legal governance of stock markets is a difficult task as evidenced by the 
repeated failure of governance systems. We identify two major sources of enforcement 
failure: deterrence failure and regulatory failure. These problems are particularly acute in 
emerging markets and transition economies, where law is underdeveloped and 
enforcement agents are weak. The prediction that follows from this diagnosis is that 
emerging markets should be prone to frequent failure, which is in fact what we observe. 
Yet, Chinese financial markets have performed substantially better than these insights 
would predict. We identify and analyze governance mechanisms that have substituted 
standard law enforcement mechanisms as known in the West with mechanisms that are 
more akin to administrative governance. We also discuss the limits of these governance 
mechanisms and call attention to the transformation of financial market governance 
currently under way in China. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the emergence of institutions governing financial markets in China, 
and explores the political determinants of institutional choice. We argue that the initial 
conditions for developing equity markets are quite unfavorable in emerging markets 
generally and in the former socialist countries in particular. The reason is that law and 
related governance mechanisms are important determinants for financial market 
development (La Porta et al., 1997; Pistor, 2001). Yet, initial conditions in emerging 
markets and in particular in transition economies suggest that they are prone to 
enforcement failure. Based on earlier work (Pistor and Xu, 2003; Xu and Pistor, 2004) 
we identify two sources of enforcement failure: deterrence failure and regulatory failure.  
Deterrence failure results from the ability of courts to effectively enforce the law. The 
reason may lie in the incentive structure courts face (Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer, 
2001a); in their corruptibility (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003); or in the fact that law is 
highly incomplete and that, therefore, even the best courts may be unable to deter 
optimally (Pistor and Xu, 2003; Xu and Pistor, 2004). Moreover, the incompleteness of 
law in emerging markets may get a lot worse due to the political economy of their 
lawmaking process.  Regulatory failure again may be caused by weak or corrupt 
regulators (Stigler, 1971), but also by the lack of reliable firm specific information 
without which regulators will either over- or under-enforce the law (Xu and Pistor, 2004). 
In transition economies deterrence failure is particularly likely, because courts are weak 
and inexperienced, and law is highly incomplete. Transplanting comprehensive legal 
codes from abroad is no easy remedy to address the incomplete law problem, because 
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these codes have not been put to a test and their meaning and application in the law 
receiving country therefore remains uncertain (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard, 2003b; 
Ohnesorg, 2003). In addition, transition economies may suffer from regulatory failure, 
because of the lack of reliable firm specific information. Given the severity of the 
deterrence and regulatory failure problems in transition economies, we predict that 
financial markets in these economies will be hard to develop or it will be retarded.  
Taking this prediction as a starting point, we selected a country that seems to defy 
our prediction. This country is China. China had a very weak legal basis when it began to 
develop financial markets in the early 1990s. Moreover, courts were weak, and – as we 
will further document below – have in fact not played an important role in enforcing 
investor rights to this day. Firm specific information has been highly distorted thereby 
undermining the effectiveness of newly established regulatory agents, the two major 
stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen, and the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). Yet, China has been remarkably successful in developing equity 
markets over the past decade. There are many problems with this market, including the 
continuing dominance of state owned enterprises, the limited amount of shares that are 
held by private investors and are tradable, and mounting problems of market 
manipulation. Nevertheless, even when adjusting standard measures of market 
performance to take account of some of these problems, China’s equity market 
performance compares favorably with that of other transition economies.  This evidence 
challenges not only our own theory, but the literature on law and finance (La Porta et al, 
1997, 1998, 2003) more generally. 
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  We suggest that this can be explained by the fact that China has deployed 
governance institutions that have mitigated the problems of deterrence and regulatory 
failure at the early stage of market development. The anchor of this governance structure 
has been the so-called quota system. This system effectively enlisted pre-existing 
institutions of state governance in the selection of companies for listing on a stock 
exchange; it utilized competition among regions for access to centrally controlled 
resources; tapped into the insider knowledge about firms by state bureaucrats at 
companies and/or local governments which was not accessible by other means; and used 
political promotion systems as well as the threat of having to bail out companies to 
impose some checks on the selection process.  
China’s initial success in building functioning governance institutions does, 
however, not guarantee the long-term success of the system. Here we depart from a 
growing literature that suggests that China’s remarkable economic development refutes 
the notion that formal legal institutions are important determinants of economic growth 
and development (Allen et al., 2002; Ohnesorg, 2003). Instead, we argue that while the 
governance structures anchored in the quota system may have been successful in 
initiating financial market development, it is not sustainable in the long term. The system 
may have worked in selecting companies for listing given the initial conditions China 
faced at the time. However, there are strong signs that existing governance mechanisms 
are failing to monitor companies once they are listed on the market. As a result China 
would be better off, if it strengthened standard law enforcement mechanisms. We find 
evidence that this is happening and that China may be transiting towards a more 
convention governance structure of its financial markets   
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This paper on the one hand documents deterrence failure and regulatory failure in 
China. On the other hand it explains why when the legal system fails to function, 
financial markets can still be jumpstarted rapidly and perform reasonably well.  
The paper builds on the growing literature on comparative governance of 
financial markets. Using newly created data bases of legal indicators, this literature has 
established the importance of formal legal institutions for financial market development, 
including minority shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1998) as well 
as mandatory disclosure rules and their enforcement (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 2002). While much of this literature samples OECD countries with well-
established equity markets, a number of studies have extended this research to emerging 
markets and transition economies. Johnson et al. (2000), for example, suggest that formal 
legal indicators in combination with perception indices on the effectiveness of law and 
legal institutions have had a strong impact on how countries in Asia weathered the storms 
of the financial crisis in the region in the late 1990s. Countries with better laws on the 
books and more effective legal institutions were less affected by the crisis than countries 
with weaker institutions. Using a broader sample of emerging markets, Claessens, 
Klingebiel and Schmukler (Claessens et al., 2002) document a positive correlation 
between the level of formal shareholder protection on the books and stock market 
development (measured as market capitalization as a share of GDP). An even stronger 
predictor of financial market development, however, is the level of GDP and the degree 
of internationalization. Yet, formal legal protections appear to have some benefits for 
firms seeking cross-listing on markets outside their home jurisdiction. 
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By contrast, Pistor et al. (2000) find no evidence that formal legal indicators are 
correlated with financial market development in 24 transition economies in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. They suggest that a major determinant for equity 
market development in the region is not primarily the law on the books, but the 
effectiveness of legal institutions. The latter, they suggest, is influenced by the legacy of 
legal development in each country (Berkowitz et al., 2003a).  
The present paper identifies the sources of weak enforcement commonly observed 
in transition economies. We use this analytical framework to analyze actual governance 
structures of financial markets in China. The paper is organized as follows. Part II 
develops the analytical framework. Part III documents the lack of effective law 
enforcement by courts and regulators in China. Part IV presents data on China’s financial 
market performance. The surprisingly strong performance in the absence of effective law 
enforcement raises the question about how markets have in fact been governed during the 
initial phase. Part V seeks to answer this question by analyzing the quota system, which 
was the prevailing governance system until now. We argue that the quota system, though 
problematic in many ways, mitigated the threat of deterrence and regulatory failure 
during the early phases of market development. Part VI assesses possible market 
distortions of the quota system and discusses its weaknesses in enforcing continuous 
disclosure and preventing rampant market abuse. Part VII concludes.  
  
II. Deterrence and Regulatory Failure 
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The formal legal framework governing financial markets in most developed economies 
today combines deterrence and regulation. The law enforcement literature going back to 
Becker’s seminal work (Becker, 1968) based on the idea of Bentham (1830) and further 
developed by Stigler (1970) and others (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) has long identified 
deterrence as the determinant factor for effective law enforcement. In recent work, we 
have sought to extend this idea to understand law enforcement institutions (Pistor and Xu, 
2003; Xu and Pistor, 2004). We argue that law is inherently incomplete, because 
lawmakers cannot foresee all future contingencies, and also because of political economy 
of lawmaking process. Even a benevolent lawmaker (court, legislature, etc.) cannot 
escape the problem that despite best efforts inherent ambiguities of language, 
socioeconomic or technological change will render law incomplete.  
Given that law is incomplete, a key challenge for any legal system is to allocate 
lawmaking and law enforcement powers (LMLEP) to achieve effective law enforcement. 
We distinguish two law enforcement mechanisms: reactive law enforcement by courts 
and proactive law enforcement by regulators. We call courts reactive law enforcers, 
because they enforce law only after a party other than the court brings an action. This 
party may be the victim, or it may be a state agent, such as a prosecutor or administrative 
agency. By contrast, regulators can take the initiative and launch an investigation, enjoin 
actions, or impose fines, and do not have to wait for others to bring such actions. The 
power to enforce the law proactively also allows regulators to be more effective 
preemptive, or ex ante, law enforcers.  
Courts and regulators may both suffer from enforcement failures, albeit for 
different reasons. The failure of courts to effectively deter violations can be attributed 
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primarily to incomplete law (Xu and Pistor, 2004). The more incomplete the law, the 
greater the likelihood that deterrence failure will occur – even when courts are optimally 
incentivized, or incorruptible. Regulatory failure, by contrast, is primarily associated with 
the lack of reliable information that both investors and regulators have to avoid harm (Xu 
and Pistor, 2004).  
In transition economies, the incompleteness of law problem and the information 
problem are both more severe than in developed market economies. Given the scale and 
scope of economic and legal reforms that are taking place concurrently, both law and 
actions subject to law enforcement are quickly moving targets. It will therefore take a 
long time before the meaning of legal rules for particular kinds of cases will be clarified. 
As a result, court enforcement cannot effectively deter violations. In fact, the level of 
incompleteness of the law may exacerbate the problem of judicial corruption, as judges 
may more easily distort the purpose of an untested legal rule than one the meaning and 
application of which has long been established.  
We argue that the problem of incomplete law is even more severe in transition 
economies today than it was at the outset of financial market development in the West. 
When England's stock market soared in the nineteenth century during the railway mania, 
there were no securities laws or regulators that would monitor the amount or type of 
information companies disclosed when issuing shares to the public. But there was a 
highly developed contract and tort law at hand (Pistor and Xu, 2003). Although the 
principles of the law had been developed with different cases in mind, a sufficiently large 
body of case law was available to determine how these principles should be applied to the 
newly arising securities fraud and misrepresentation of information cases. Moreover, 
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courts had experience with handling matters of a commercial nature and with adapting 
law over time in response to new fact patterns. Although court enforcement ultimately 
proved to be insufficient for dealing with the problem of law enforcement in securities 
matters, courts nevertheless played an important role in advancing legal standards to deal 
with stock fraud schemes and imposing civil and criminal liability. Moreover, the 
legislature closely observed case law and readily intervened whenever it saw reasons to 
fill gaps left by the courts or to correct decisions made by them. 
The former socialist countries did not have the benefit of a developed contract or 
tort law to build on for addressing problems related to misrepresentation of information 
on securities markets. While some countries had enacted state of the art civil and 
commercial codes during the inter-war period, others had never developed a 
comprehensive formal legal framework prior to the establishment of the socialist regime 
(Pistor, 2000). China was home to a flourishing stock exchange in Shanghai in the 1920s 
and enacted a basic set of codes based primarily on German models at the time (Kirby, 
1995). However, this legal framework was systematically dismantled under the 
Communist period. Only with the introduction of economic reforms did China embark on 
the creation of a new formal legal framework for economic transactions. The most 
important pieces of legislation for dealing with securities fraud include the 1986 
Principles of Civil Law, the 1991 Civil Procedure Law, the 1994 Corporate Law, and the 
1999 Securities law.  
Enacting law on the books is only the very first step in establishing an effective 
legal system. Because law is incomplete, its meaning and implication for a particular fact 
pattern cannot be easily derived from statutory law alone. This is certainly the case when 
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broad, ambiguous standards are used to define liability (Kaplow, 1992). But even when 
law is more specifically circumscribed in the form of bright-line rules (Hay, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1996), new fact patterns raise new questions about how the law should be 
interpreted. It is impossible to stipulate all the possible meanings and applications of the 
fiduciary duties a director or managers owes to the corporation. Any attempt to do so 
would leave key aspects unresolved. By using broad, ambiguous terms, lawmakers in 
essence invite law enforcers to give meaning to this provision when applying it to 
specific cases, or put differently, they allocate residual lawmaking powers to enforcement 
agents, i.e. courts and/or regulators. Conversely, attempts to clearly articulate actions that 
are considered violations of the law invite strategies aimed at circumventing the law. 
They require future lawmaking to avoid major gaps developing in the law. The greater 
the pace of socio-economic and/or technological change, the greater the vulnerability of 
law to deterrence failure that results from incomplete law.  
In order to address the deterrence failure problem it may be advisable to introduce 
regulators. We suggest that regulators combine flexible lawmaking with proactive law 
enforcement powers, which distinguishes them from courts, which exercise 
predominantly ex post law making and reactive law enforcement powers. The proactive 
enforcement powers allow regulators to enforce law ex ante by screening and monitoring 
companies in order to prevent actions that have the potential of causing harm. The 
efficacy of these regulatory tools, however, depends crucially on the quality of company 
specific information (Xu and Pistor, 2004).
3  
                                                 
3 Recent literature on financial market development in transition economies has drawn attention to 
regulators, albeit for somewhat different reasons. Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001b) suggest that 
regulators may be superior law enforcers to courts because they can be better incentivized. Similarly, 
Glaeser and Shleifer argue that the rise of the regulatory state in the US can be explained by apparent 
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In transition economies, reliable company specific information is difficult to 
obtain and standard practices, such as disclosure of financial information may be more 
misleading than reflecting the true underlying value of a company. State owned 
enterprises are especially affected, as their accounts were created on the basis of socialist 
book-keeping with little relation to market principles (Bailey, 1995). The balance sheets 
of firms listed on China’s stock exchanges to this day have double entries: one for the 
value of company assets according to legal accounting principles, which may be legal, 
but do not present the intrinsic value of the firm, and another with re-evaluation 
estimates, which may be closer to the actual market value, but remain guesswork in an 
environment where markets for many assets remain underdeveloped (Fang, 1995). The 
information problem is aggravated by the absence of reliable independent sources of 
information as well as professional intermediaries particularly at the early stages of 
China’s financial market development. 
Given the severity of incomplete law problem and the information problem in 
transition economies, enforcement failure is likely to occur in their financial market 
development. The result may be either the failure of markets to take off, or the collapse of 
the market.  
 
III. Law & Law Enforcement in China 
 
In this section we diagnose the existing legal and regulatory framework for 
financial markets in China. During the Cultural Revolution China had all but dismantled 
                                                                                                                                                 
weaknesses of the courts in the preceding period, when judicial corruption was rampant (Glaeser and 
Shleifer, 2003). Or argument is somewhat different and focuses on structural features law enforcement by 
regulators. 
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the formal legal system it had begun to build in the early 20
th century and the parts it had 
transplanted from the Soviet Union in the 1950s. With the introduction of economic 
reforms in 1978, China started virtually from scratch. Unlike the former socialist 
countries, however, China did not embrace the notion of establishing a legal framework 
for a market based economy, which is clearly reflected in the laws. The corporate law 
enacted in 1994, for example, is designed for state owned enterprises and sets forth 
detailed procedures for corporatizing these companies. By contrast, it is mostly silent on 
newly created companies with different ownership structures (Fang, 1995; Wang, 1994). 
In fact, China did not recognize the notion of private property in its constitution until this 
year. Not surprisingly, the formal legal framework governing securities markets was 
targeted at state owned enterprises (Zhu, 2000).  
Many informally established exchanges that had mushroomed in the 1980s were 
closed down in the early 1990s as government officials focused attention on creating 
equity markets for the purpose of financing the existing state owned enterprise sector. 
Initially, the tools used to build equity markets resembled those used in other economies, 
particularly in the early days of their development. Merit requirements were established 
as a means to screen companies that applied for access to equity markets. The State 
Council’s Provisional Regulations on the Administration of Issuing and Trading Shares 
of 1993 and the 1994 Company Law set forth a list of merit requirements companies that 
wished to be listed on one of the state approved stock exchanges had to meet. These 
requirements included at least three years of operation; continuous profitability during 
this period; more than 1,000 shareholders holders; and registered capital of at least RMB 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art77  13
400 Million (Wang, 1994). This system, however, was never put in action but was de 
facto over-ruled by the quota system (see Part IV below).  
China developed a basic legal framework over the last two decades, including the 
Principles of Civil Law enacted in 1986, and the 1999 Securities Law. The latter 
includes a series of provisions that allow the agency that emerged as China’s most 
important regulator, the CSRC, to sanction violators or for investors to seek damages 
from them. Most of these laws (if not all of them) are highly incomplete as a result of 
weak lawmaking institution and the highly politicized lawmaking process. As a result, 
these laws often are poorly drafted and frequently inconsistent with provisions found in 
other statutes. They are therefore difficult, some times impossible, to enforce.  Rather 
than enumerating the many inconsistencies and the scope of incompleteness of the law, 
we focus on actual enforcement activities. The main purpose of this analysis is to 
demonstrate the weakness of formal law enforcement and to set the stage for an analysis 
of the actual governance of China’s financial market beyond law enforcement. 
Consistent with the general analytical framework we assess reactive and proactive 
enforcement activities separately.  
 
Reactive Enforcement Activities 
In most Western market economies the default enforcement agents are the courts 
performing the dual functions of resolving disputes among private parties and imposing 
criminal sanctions. By contrast, hina has a long tradition of using courts primarily as 
agents for criminal and administrative law enforcement. Since the introduction of 
economic reforms in China in 1978, the number of civil disputes has increased 
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substantially. While in 1983 only 44,080 economic cases were filed at first instance 
courts, this increased to 1,278,806 in 1995, representing an increase from 43.1 to 1,065.5 
cases per million people (Pistor and Wellons, 1999). In comparison, in Taiwan 4,350 
cases per million people were filed in 1995, and 9,482 in Malaysia, suggesting that the 
starting from a very low level although the change is extremely rapid by the mid 1990s 
China’s level of litigiousness lacked far behind other Asian economies.  
Even though civil litigation has been increasing in China, private suits have 
played no role in enforcing investor rights in financial markets so far, mostly because 
courts refused to hear such cases, rather than because of a lack of demand for them. The 
greater demand for litigation is evidenced by a rising tide of investor lawsuits (Chen, 
2003), which until now has been controlled only by the courts rigorously restricting 
access to them. To this day, private litigation has not resulted in major liabilities imposed 
by the courts (see Table 1).  
To illustrate the struggle over civil litigation in China, consider the following 
case. In the summer of 2001, Caijing, a leading financial newspaper exposed a fraud at a 
recently listed company, Guangxia (Magida, 2003). The company from Ningxia Hui 
Autnomous Region, one of the poorer provinces in China, originally engaged in computer 
software. Prior to seeking listing on the Shenzhen stock exchange it redirected its 
activities into wine growing and subsequently diversified into real estate, hotels and car 
dealerships. In 2001 it made plans for listing on the Hong Kong main board, but these 
plans were undermined when Caijing revealed serious fraudulent misrepresentation. At 
the core of the allegation was misrepresentation of the company’s export activities, in 
particular their claim that they were deeply involved with a German firm with a long 
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history, while in fact they had used a small front company to create the impression of 
substantial export activities. In addition, the company had misstated the financial 
accounts of its subsidiaries. Only after the press had revealed this fraudulent scheme did 
the Shenzhen stock exchange and the CSRC become active, suspended trading and began 
an investigation. Disgruntled investors sought to take the matter into their own hands and 
brought civil action: 1,000 cases were filed in Wuxi, Jiangus Province against Guangxia 
alone. In addition, another 360 law suits were filed in Beijing in an unrelated case against 
Yorkpoint Science and Technology.
4 A trial date for the Guangxia case had been set for 
15 October, when the Chinese Supreme Peoples’ Court (SPC) intervened with a “Notice” 
that temporarily banned investor law suits in China.
5  
According to Chinese law, the SPC may issue guidelines about judicial practices 
even in the absence of a specific case brought before it. This obviously contrasts with our 
characterization of courts as pure reactive law enforcers. The same practice was common 
in the Soviet Union and is still the rule in Russia and other former republics of the Soviet 
Union (Hendley, 1998). The “Notice” stated that “our country’s capital markets are in a 
period of continuous standardization and development and a number of problems have 
arisen including insider trading, cheating, market manipulation and other behaviors.” The 
court acknowledged that these behaviors “infringe upon investor’s legal rights”, but 
                                                 
4 Bei Hu, Call for Trial Guidelines in Civil Actions; Courts Told to Stop Accepting Cases Involving 
Damage Claims by Investors Pending Internal Consultations, South China Morning Post, September 26, 
2001, LEXIS, News Library, ARCH File. 
5 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu She Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Anjian Zhanbu Shouli De Tongshi 
[Supreme People's Court Notice on the Temporary Ban on Acceptance of Securities Related Civil 
Compensation Cases], September 21, 2001, (2001) No. 406, available at 
http://www.chinalawnet.com/law/law07_12.asp. 
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pointed out that “under current legislative and judicial limits [courts] still don’t have the 
conditions to accept and hear this type of cases.”
6
The Notice was opposed by investors as well as law firms representing them and 
was equally criticized by the CSRC, which had supported investor litigation. In January 
2002 the SPC modified the Notice of September 2001. The court now stated that 
investors may bring civil action against misrepresentation of information – not however, 
against insider trading and market manipulation. Courts were now directed to hear cases, 
but only after the CSRC, the primary proactive law enforcement agents had investigated 
them and had found wrongdoing. These cases must be brought within two years after 
CSRC’s rulings. Individual or independent action as well as group, or joint, actions 
(gongtong) were permitted, but class actions were explicitly ruled out. 
The difference between joint actions and class actions are of procedural nature 
with important implications for the cost of litigation. Joint actions are explicitly permitted 
in China’s 1991 Civil Procedure Law. They allow for more than one litigant to join in a 
single case against a defendant. However, the litigants will have to be identified 
individually and be named in the action brought and the outcome of the case has no effect 
on the class members not specifically mentioned and do not participate in the trial. Thus, 
a defendant may face additional litigation even after a case with a particular group of 
litigants has been resolved. In January 2003, the SPC issued more extensive rules 
governing investor law suits, the Private Securities Litigation Rules (hereinafter PSLRs). 
The rules do not extend investor litigation to issues other than misrepresentation of 
information, but they relax the rules on joint litigation. Litigants are allowed file jointly 
and to elect between two and five representatives. The PSLRs do not explicitly state the 
                                                 
6 Ibid. Translation by Daniel Magida. 
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upper limit of litigants who may join in a single action, but a commentary published by 
one of the judges involved in the case suggested that groups of 10 to 20 plaintiffs was 
what the court had in mind.
7 The PSLRs also require that law suits are filed in the 
jurisdiction where the defendant company is registered. This rule is likely to re-enforce 
the well known “home-bias” of China’s courts (Lubman, 1995). It also implies that 
expertise in securities matters will take a long time to build as they cannot be pooled in 
courts with the greatest expertise.  
In the meantime many investor law suits have been filed anew to comply with 
these rulings. Most of these cases have either been settled or their resolution is still 
outstanding. Table 1 summarizes law suits filed after the September 2002 SPC ruling that 
have been widely reported in the Chinese press and their current state of resolution. So 
far not a single civil law case has resulted in liability imposed by a court, although some 
cases have been settled after court mediation. We interpret this evidence to suggest that 
civil liability has virtually no deterrence effect in the current legal environment.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
In addition to civil litigation, the Chinese Peoples’ Courts are in charge of 
criminal law enforcement. China is known for stiff punishments and little respect for rule 
of law principles, such as “nulla poena sine crimen” (no punishment without crime), the 
presumption of innocence, or the proportionality between the committed offense and the 
                                                 
7 Gu Wei, Ruhe Lijie <Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Xujia Chenshu Minshi Peichang Anjian De 
Nuogan Guiding>>, [How to Understand <Several Regulations of the Supreme People's Court Concerning 
the Hearing of Civil Compensation Cases Caused by Fraudulent Misrepresentation in the Stock Market>, 
Renmin Fayuan Bao [People’s Court Daily]. 
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punishment. In its recent China report, Amnesty International notes that “the combined 
effects of repressive and vaguely worded criminal legislation, the use of administrative 
detention, a weak judiciary and impunity for officials who abuse their power continued to 
result I widespread abuses of human rights.”
8 Data on enforcement of cases involving 
securities fraud is again largely anecdotal, as systematic statistical data from the lower 
courts on these specific types of cases is not available.  In press reports about criminal 
cases brought against individuals accused of fraudulent activities, we find some evidence 
for retroactive or disproportionate punishment, but not to an extent that would suggest 
that the level of punishment applied by Chinese courts would fully offset the deterrence 
failure problems we outlined above.  
Consider the following examples: In October 1993 investor Li bought shares in 
Susanshan company only to witness a steep drop in the share price shortly thereafter. Mr. 
Li took counter measures to protect the value of his shares by fabricating information 
about “big purchases” of the company’s stock that he sent to the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange where the company was listed. As a result of his manipulations the stock price 
recovered, at which point he dumped his shares and recovered his investments. At the 
time of his action, the Criminal Code did not include a provision stipulating that 
“producing and spreading false information about securities exchanges” constituted a 
criminal offense. This provision was included in the code only in 1997. Nevertheless, the 
court sanctioned Mr. Li citing a provision in the 1979 Criminal Codes that was in effect 
in 1993, which broadly outlawed speculative activities. Mr. Li was sentenced for 2.5 
years imprisonment and fined for 10,000 Yuan. In another case Zhao Zhe was sentence to 
                                                 
8 See the China report for 2003 by Amnesty International at www. http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/chn-
summary-eng [last visited 28 April 2004]. 
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three years imprisonment for invading the computer system of Zhongya Trust and 
Investment company and manipulating the price of listed companies helping him and his 
friends who held shares in some of the companies to make RMB 90,000 while investors 
allegedly lost a total of 2.95 Mln. He received a three year prison term, was fined for 
RMG 10,000 and had to pay the company RMB 2.5 Mln in compensation. 
Similar attempts of share price manipulation have been rampant in the early 
stages of financial market development in the West. English courts were reluctant to 
impose criminal liability mostly because the threshold for establishing evidence is 
substantially higher for criminal than for civil law (Pistor and Xu, 2003). There is also 
some evidence that judges were inclined to turn a blind eye to white collar crimes (Robb, 
1992). Chinese courts are obviously less constraint. In particular, the enforcement of a 
law, such as the 1979 Criminal Code, that was obviously designed to punish any kind of 
market activities which were deemed to be speculative per se, raises the specter of 
arbitrariness and over-deterrence. Still, the level of punishment as applied in these cases 
alone is unlikely to deter future violations sufficiently to mitigate the weakening of the 
deterrence effect resulting from highly incomplete law and a rather low probability of 
being caught in a volatile, non-transparent market.  
There is anecdotal evidence that criminal law enforcement is more extensive than 
a couple of press reports suggest. Even in cases where evidence is not sufficient to result 
in conviction under Chinese legal standards, the rounding up of executives or financial 
analysists and their detention for days if not weeks alone can be a strong deterrent. We 
can therefore not rule out completely that law has a deterrence effect in China. Yet, the 
amount of fraudulent activities reported in the press or revealed in surveys of market 
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insiders (Xie and Lu, 2003) that go unsanctioned suggest that the overall effect is rather 
modest. 
 
Proactive Enforcement Activities 
Law enforcement by regulators has also been weak in China. As noted above, the 
defining characteristic of regulators as compared with courts is that regulators are 
proactive law enforcers. They can initiate law enforcement proceedings without the 
victim or the police or any other agent brining a case to their attention. This enables them 
in principle to be better ex ante law enforcers, i.e. to stop actions before harm has been 
done. But it also allows them to be effective ex post law enforcers.  
Our evidence on the functioning of regulatory agents in China suggests that their 
role as ex ante law enforcers was severely limited by the lack of reliable company level 
information, the lack of a proper legal regime for disclosure at least at the outset, and the 
politicization of the listing and public issuance processes. The lack of reliable firm 
specific information is an inherent problem of the transition process. Both state owned 
enterprises and recently privatized former state owned enterprises had assets and 
liabilities, the value of which was difficult to ascertain. The problem of valuing illiquid 
assets, such as the value of closely held corporations or of assets for which a market does 
not exist, is difficult enough in developed market economies (Benston et al., 2003). These 
difficulties are exacerbated in China and other transition economies, where markets for 
virtually all assets are only emerging and the book value does not even contain 
meaningful information about historic market value. Even if companies adopt Western 
style accounting standards, the problems are not easily resolved (Bailey, 1995).  
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In addition, a market for financial intermediaries capable of collecting and 
assessing whatever firm level information is available, is also only developing. Securities 
firms mushroomed in China in the late 1980s and early 1990s, engaging in activities that 
ranged from real estate transactions over direct investments to insurance business. Since 
1995 registered securities firms have been required to focus on core activities, including 
underwriting, brokering shares for clients, and proprietary trading (Green, 2003). Most 
securities firms are state owned companies or were set up by ministries or other 
government agencies, even if their legal form – i.e. shareholding or limited liability 
company – disguises the identity of their owners. Their background and knowledge of the 
workings of government administrations as well as access to insider familiar with the 
state owned firms listed on stock exchanges gave them access to crucial information. 
However, this information was frequently used by traders at securities firms to engage in 
“extensive manipulation and insider trading”.
9 In other words, while financial 
intermediaries are often regarded as at least a partial solution to the information problem 
(Gilson and Kraakman, 1993), in emerging markets, they are often at least part of the 
problem (Green, 2003). The implication for law enforcement by regulators is that they 
have little reliable information to go by and thus are likely to commit substantial errors 
when enforcing law ex ante, i.e. by approving or denying approval for the issuance of 
shares to the public; or by enjoining other activities that may (or may not) result in harm.  
The major central government regulator of the Chinese financial market today is 
the CSRC. In the early days proactive law enforcement was scattered among various state 
agents, including the state owned stock exchanges, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), 
the CSRC and the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC). The increasing 
                                                 
9 See Green (2003) at p. 89. 
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centralization of financial market regulation was a response to failures of the system.  In 
particular, a securities scandal in the summer of 1992 which caused rioting by investors 
resulted in the reallocation of regulatory activities away from the PBC and its local 
branches. Investor riots broke out after it was discovered that the shares of a company 
that were to be floated to the public had almost been fully subscribed to by government 
insiders, including agents of the PBC (Walter and Howie, 2003). Directly in response to 
these events, the State Council established the State Council Securities Commission 
(SCSC) as well as the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission. The SCSC became an 
important body for developing policies for financial markets, but did not become a full-
blown regulator. This task was increasingly taken up by the CSRC. In 1998, the two 
agencies were merged into a single agency, the CSRC. The chairman of the CSRC is ex 
officio member of the State Council. Thus, there is no attempt to create an independent 
regulatory body. The CSRC was given some lawmaking power, and it issued listing 
requirements as early as 1993. The CSRC assumed ministerial status in 1998 and its 
formal powers have considerably grown since. In 1999, China's first comprehensive 
Securities Law was enacted. The law vests the CSRC with the primary power to regulate 
markets, yet allows it to delegate decisions, including admission to trading, to the stock 
exchanges. Under the law, the CSRC may issue implementing regulations and it has 
made extensive use of this authority by issuing a host of rules and regulations for issuing 
companies and intermediaries alike. One of the most important changes for the CSRC’s 
role as an enforcement agent for financial market regulations came in 2000 with the 
expansion of its enforcement unit not only in the central office in Beijing, but also in 
numerous branch offices (Walter and Howie, 2003). Enforcement activities have 
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increased since. Nevertheless, available data on enforcement activities suggest that they 
remain rather timid. Table 2 summarizes enforcement activities by the CSRC from 1998 
until the end of March 2004. The numbers stand for enforcement events, not companies 
against which enforcement actions were taken. Thus, the total number of companies 
subjected to any enforcement is lower than 224 in total, or 81 for the CSRC.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
Interpreting enforcement activities is no mean task, mostly because there are no 
good comparative data available that could be used as a benchmark. However, it is worth 
noting that in 2003, when total enforcement procedures reached 51 for all enforcement 
agents and 15 by the CSRC, there were 1,278 companies listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. Ignoring the fact that not each enforcement activity represents enforcement 
against a different company and that enforcement activities were directed not only against 
issuing companies, but also against intermediaries, this means that on average only every 
25th company was subjected to any kind of enforcement activity, or every 85
th company 
was subject to enforcement proceedings initiated by the CSRC. In the US, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission has initiated 598 enforcement actions in 2002
10 of which 518 
were targeted at an issuing entity.
11 The SEC regulates all companies that are traded on 
national exchanges, which is larger than the roughly 2,800 companies currently listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange. Nevertheless, as a rough approximation using the number 
                                                 
10 See the annual report of the SEC for 2002 (latest report available online) at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep02.shtml [last visited 28 April 2004]. 
11 See the more detailed data in the SEC performance report http://www.sec.gov/about/gpra2004-
2002.shtml [last visited 28 April 2004]. 
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of stocks currently listed on NYSE suggests that every 5
th company listed on that 
exchange has been subject to SEC enforcement proceedings in 2002. The impression of 
low enforcement activities in China’s financial market is re-enforced by the choice of 
sanctions. Table 3 below summarizes the type of sanctions that were imposed by the 
CSRC, the stock exchanges or other enforcement agents. Among the public sanctions 
were 41 cases of fines in the amount of RMB 30,000 to 2,000,000. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
Assessing Formal Law Enforcement 
The analysis of enforcement activities against companies or intermediaries that 
violate investor rights suggests that formal law enforcement in China has not been very 
effective. Courts are weak and have not plaid a role in civil litigation, although their role 
as criminal law enforcers may be somewhat stronger. The powers of key regulatory 
enforcement agents have increased over time, but actual enforcement activities are low 
and the level of sanctions they have imposed are modest. In part, this is a function of 
political constraints placed on legal institutions. The decision of the Supreme Peoples’ 
Court in 2001 not to hear investor law suits was most likely dictated by Party concerns 
about the prospects of organized legal opposition to government activities. Precisely 
because all listed companies are state owned companies and the majority of their shares is 
held by legal persons that are themselves government agencies or controlled by them, 
adversarial litigation raises the specter of opposition (Chen, 2003). The denial of class 
action status to joint actions and the attempt to keep down the number of law suits that 
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are joined in a single action reflect a similar concern. Whatever the causes, the 
implication is that formal law enforcement has been weak. Courts did not play a role as 
important law enforcers during the initial phase of China’s financial market development. 
Even in the absence of these political constraints, courts would have had a difficult time 
to do so. At the time financial market development took off, China did not have a well 
developed body of contract or tort law. Moreover, the criminal code had not been updated 
to account for the kind of white collar crimes that arise with the development of financial 
markets. The broad anti-speculator provisions of the 1979 Criminal Code were highly 
ambiguous, raising concerns to both over- and under-enforcement of the law.  
Equally, proactive law enforcement could not function effectively in an 
environment where reliable firm specific information processed and analyzed by 
professional financial intermediaries was absent. In fact, the low number of enforcement 
activities by the CSRC and other regulators reported above may be taken not only as a 
sign for political intervention in the enforcement process (although this may very well be 
the case), but also for the difficulties of enforcing securities fraud in such an 
environment. It is impossible to weigh the relative impact of the political factors on the 
one hand, and the structural factors, including incomplete law and information problems, 
on the other. Whatever their weight, in combination these factors suggest that formal law 
enforcement in China has been weak. Based on available empirical evidence that strong 
investor protection and effective enforcement is crucial for financial market development, 
we would therefore expect to see a highly underdeveloped financial market, or else need 
to explain the kind of governance mechanisms that have allowed the markets to take off 
despite the weaknesses of the formal legal framework.  
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IV. China’s Financial Market Development 
 
Any assessment of China’s stock market development must start from the fact that 
the market was created for the purpose of financing China’s state owned enterprise 
sector. In the 1980s equity markets mushroomed more broadly and many non-state 
owned companies raised funds by issuing shares [Tam, 1991 #2373]. These markets were 
cl0osed down and only two stock exchanges remained after 1991, the Shanghai and the 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Listing on these exchanges was subject to central state 
approval, which ensured until very recently the dominance of state owned enterprises, 
even though this was nowhere explicitly stated. As a result, 80 percent of companies that 
are currently listed on the exchange are controlled by the state (Chen, 2003). With 
regards to the state controlled firms, on average less than 40% of shares are freely 
negotiable, 60% belong to state agents who may trade them among themselves, but may 
not freely trade them with private investors. Table 4 below presents the average 
shareholder structure of listed companies in China at the end of 2001. Among the 
negotiable shares, A shares are shares held by domestic investors, B shares are shares 
held by foreign investors, and H and S shares are traded on exchanges outside the 
mainland (i.e. in Hong Kong). Investors of A shares are primarily individual investors as 
well as securities firms and a growing number of institutional investors (Green, 2003). 
Their relative stakes tend to be small not only in relation to the various state agents, but 
also to each other. 
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[INSERT TABLE 4]  
 
As of April 2004, a total of 1274 companies were listed on the two main 
exchanges. The number of listings in each year increased from only 13 in 1991 to 206 in 
1997 and leveled off 71 in 2002 (Chen, 2003). The total amount of funds raised through 
initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings amounts to 751,159 Mln Yuan 
(Green and Ming, 2004).  
The performance of China’s financial markets should be measured not only in 
absolute, but also in relative terms. The major challenge here is to find the right 
comparison. Comparing China with the most developed market economies makes little 
sense in light of its low level of GDP, which is a strong predictor for financial market 
development (Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler, 2002; Levine and Zervos, 1996). 
Even a simple comparison with emerging markets may be misleading as not all faced the 
same adverse initial conditions for market development as did the (former) socialist 
countries with extensive state ownership, centrally planned economies, and a highly 
underdeveloped legal system for markets in general. Table 5 below compares China with 
other transition economies on the basis of market capitalization. The first row gives 
China’s unadjusted market capitalization. The second row adjusts this number by 
excluding the non-negotiable state-owned shares. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
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The data suggest that China’s market capitalization in nominal terms is relatively 
high when compared with other transition economies even after excluding the state 
controlled shares (adjusted market capitalization). If one were to adjust for the percentage 
of stock held by large shareholders in other transition economies, some of which are 
directly or indirectly controlled by the state, the picture would even be more favorable. 
According to calculations by Pajuste (2002), on average the largest single shareholder 
holds 47.3% of voting power in nine Eastern European economies. The percentage of 
(adjusted) market capitalization to GDP shows that China’s financial market is smaller on 
average than other transition economies. Controlling per capita GNI, however, suggests 
that China is fairing quite well.
12 China certainly has more firms listed than any other 
transition economy today, namely roughly 1300 whereas Poland has 230, and Hungary 
56.  Other indicators that measure the relative transparency of stock markets also suggest 
that China has come some way in developing financial markets. Morck et al use the co-
movement of stock on a given market as a measure for the level of firm-specific 
information available to investors. They show that emerging markets in general have 
much higher levels of co-movement than do developed market economies (Morck, 
Yeung, and Yu, 1999). In the international comparison of the level of co-movement for 
1993, China is at the bottom of the scale with a co-movement indicator (R square) of 
0.31, as compared to the US, where it is 0.03. By 2001, however this indicator had 
improved to 0.22 suggesting that investors had substantially more firm specific 
                                                 
12 Ibid at p. 407. 
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information at their disposal by then.
13 By comparison the R-square for Russia was .28 in 
1995 and .37 in 2000.
14
In summary, with appropriate adjustments China’s financial market development 
over the past 10 years remains substantial even though it may be less impressive than is 
often alleged. These results stand in contrast to the weak formal lega; regime. The next 
section seeks to explain how China’s financial markets have been governed, given that 
formal law has played such a minor role.  
 
V. Governance Mechanisms Beyond Law Enforcement 
  
At the core of the governance system of financial markets in China during the 
initial phase is the so-called quota system. The quota system was officially in place from 
1993 and 2000. De facto, it governed financial markets until the beginning of 2004, 
because many companies that were selected under the quota system were placed on a 
queue and were released to the market only over time. While the system was in operation, 
China developed a formal legal framework for financial market governance, including 
merit and disclosure rules. These rules increasingly complemented the quota system. 
However, it is only now that formal legal governance structures are becoming the 
primary governance structure of financial markets.  
The quota system was not invented for financial markets. It is a basic feature of 
centralized state planning as practiced in China during the transition period and has been 
widely used for allocating credit, energy, and other resources among regions.  It was 
                                                 
13 We are gratefult to Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung for making these additional data available to us.  
14 This may reflect the fact that in Russia primarily oil stocks are traded, and that these stocks move closely 
together.  
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established for financial markets after a growing number of firms had begun to issue 
shares to the public relying only on approval by provincial governments or the stock 
exchanges (Fang, 1995).
15 The central government sanctioned local approval only for 
shares that were issued to employees of the company. For issuing shares to the public, it 
reserved the exclusive right of final approval. Between 1986 and 1992 the central 
government regulator for financial markets was the People’s Bank of China (PBoC); sine 
then it has been the CSRC . The first guidelines for the quota system were issued by the 
PBoC in April of 1992.  
The quota system uses central governance and regional competition as its major 
governance devices. Each year provincial government organs work out with the 
provincial branches of the central government the size of the quota desired by that region. 
This request together with information about the relevant companies seeking to issue 
shares is then submitted to the center. On the basis of similar information received from 
all provinces, the central government bargains with the governments of the provinces 
about the size of the quota each one of them will receive. After the quota for a province 
has been set, individual companies’ applications are submitted to the central government 
regulator. At this stage the applicants are vetted for compliance with the formal merit and 
disclosure requirements set forth in relevant statutes and regulations.  
The quota system was established to ensure central government control over 
financial markets. However, it also functioned as an important administrative governance 
device, which is the point we focus on. Specifically, the governance mechanisms the 
quota system employed consisted of decentralized bargaining and information collection; 
                                                 
15 The description on how the quota system worked is based on (Fang, 1995) and information collected 
from interviews with agents at the CSRC, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, et al. 
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incentive structures that mitigated against the worst frauds at IPO stage; and central 
government oversight and control.
 16
The quota system established the framework for a bargaining process that 
imposed a ‘quantity constraint’ on the provinces. The quantity constraint required 
provinces to select specific companies for listing and this selection process in turn 
generated information collection from insiders with knowledge about these companies. 
The checks and balances built into the system ensured that this selection process did not 
result in a race to the bottom.   
This virtuous outcome of the bargaining and information revelation process may 
not have prevailed in all cases. However, we suggest that sufficient checks and balances 
were built into the system to avoid the worst-case scenario. In the worst case scenario, the 
described bargaining process allowed the most powerful agents at the provincial level to 
choose their favorite companies even when these were the worst performing companies 
in the region. There are good reasons to believe that the provincial government may have 
wanted to choose the worst performing companies in the hope that the funds raised by 
issuing shares would keep these companies afloat and reduce the burden on the local 
budget. Subsequently, financial accounts may have been manipulated to disguise the 
actual state of the company (Chen, 2003). Although this strategy may well have been 
followed in some cases, we suggest that this was not the dominant strategy chosen. In 
particular, available data suggest that the performance of listed companies has been on 
                                                 
16 The quota system has been widely criticized as intrusive government management of the issuing and 
listing process fostering corruption and insider dealings (e.g., Chen, 2003; Green, 2003). We do not 
disagree with them that many of these allegations are true. We submit, however, that they overlook 
important governance features of the quota system. 
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average superior to non-listed companies as measured by the level and variance in 
profitability [TBA]. 
The checks and balances built into the system include the following. First, prior to 
allocating a quota to a province the companies selected for issuing shares are already 
screened by the central government. The central government has incentives to avoid 
market crashes and will therefore avoid bringing primarily lemons to the market. Second, 
a province may lose its prospects of receiving additional quotas in the future, if it 
systematically brings under-performed companies to the market. Third, a regional 
government remains in control over its firms even after their shares have been issued to 
the public. In particular, a province may have to bail out a failing company, which is a 
drain on its resources, Moreover, performance of listed companies is highly publicized by 
an increasingly sophisticated financial press (Liebman, 2004), putting additional 
pressures on its owners. Fourth, successful governors see their next career move in the 
central government or the Party apparatus (Huang, 1996), and their future will depend on 
the economic performance of their province. Finally, before finally admitted to issue 
shares to the public and to listing, the selected company will be screened by the CSRC 
and the authorities of the relevant stock exchanges. The CSRC itself is monitored by the 
State Council. However, more decentralized control mechanisms seem to be at work as 
well. Most importantly, companies backed by their home provinces have taken to the 
courts when they felt that the CSRC denied their approval without justification. In 2001 
the first such case, ‘Kaili v CSRC’ was decided in favor of the company and against the 
CSRC.
17 The case has been a landmark case in that it was the first successful case by a 
                                                 
17 With support from the Chinese Minority Ethnic Affairs Commission (guo-jia min-zu shi-wu wei-yuan-
hui) and Hainan province. Hainan-Kaili company applied to issue A shares using the quota that had been 
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company against a state agent. However, it also raises important questions about the 
relation between courts and the regulator in enforcing securities regulations, and as such 
illustrates the problems of law enforcement in a country where the rule of law is only 
slowly taking hold.  
Our analysis suggests that the governance structure based on the quota system 
helped mitigate the major challenges of deterrence and regulatory failure transition 
economies face. We documented in Part III above that China’s legal system was seriously 
underdeveloped at the outset of financial market development. Given these constraints, 
China could not possible rely on reactive law enforcement to minimize cheating. It was 
therefore sensible to focus on ex ante screening of companies. This could have been 
accomplished to some extent by a simple merit system. However, merit requirements are 
crude indicators for company performance or future prospects. Whether a company has 
existed for at least three years or has been profitable during that time does not necessarily 
imply what its future prospects might be. Furthermore, merit criteria were easy to 
manipulate. The profitability of a company is established in financial accounts, but these 
were unreliable for reasons stated above. They also give regulators substantial 
discretionary powers, which make them vulnerable to corruption.  
Alternatively, ex ante screening can be accomplished by a disclosure regime. As 
argued above, the effectiveness of a disclosure regime is contingent on reliable firm 
                                                                                                                                                 
assigned to Hainan province in 1998. The application was rejected by the CSRC in 2000 citing fraudulent 
financial reports. Moreover, the CSRC returned all application materials, which implied that Kaili would 
not be able to apply again. Kaili sued the CSRC in the Beijing Intermediate Court later in the same year. 
On Dec 18, 2000, the Court decided that the CSRC’s decision to deprive Kaili’s qualification to apply for 
issuing shares has no legal ground. The CSRC appealed to the Beijing Supreme Court. On July 5, 2001 the 
Beijing Supreme Court decided to maintain the Beijing Intermediate Courts decision against the CSRC 
(Legal Daily (fa-zhi bao) 25 July 2001, http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2001-
07/25/content_21457.htm ). This is the first lawsuit against a central government agent in history of 
PRChina.  
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specific information a regulator can easily verify. This was clearly not available in China 
ten years ago. Instead, the quota system created ex ante screening by fostering 
decentralized information collection that was subsequently vetted by central agents. 
Moreover, the checks and balances between central and regional governments help curb 
abuse of power and corruption to some degree. We do not make a claim that this has 
resulted in selecting the best performing companies and in preventing corruption, but 
suggest that this system has worked against selecting lemons on a grand scale. It thereby 
mitigated the problem of regulatory failure, which we have identified as a major 
impediment to the development of emerging financial markets.  
Our account of how the quota system worked is consistent with other work that 
highlights the role of government and party structures in governing China’s economy. 
Qian and Xu (1993) and Xu and Zhuang (1998) argue that government can be a 
transitional institution of firm level governance in the former socialist countries at least 
during the initial period when markets are not yet developed and market failure therefore 
is rampant. Absent effective oversight by the central government, however, 
decentralization may promote the maximization of local interests with adverse 
consequences for economic performance (Zhuravskaya, 2000). We suggest that for the 
governance of financial markets effective oversight by central regulators was crucial for 
avoiding a race to the bottom. It was the CSRC at the central level that screened the final 
application of companies put forward for public offerings and listing and it was the 
prospect of future jobs in the central government for local governors that created some 
checks on their behavior in selecting companies for listing. This, to some extend, is 
consistent with Blanchard and Shleifer (2000). 
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VI. Impact of the Quota System on Market Development 
 
In this section we turn to evidence on how the quota system affected the 
composition of financial markets. In particular, we are interested in whether or not the 
system distorted markets by over- or under-representing particular regions and whether 
law enforcement was biased in favor or against others.  
According to statistics available from the CSRC, virtually all provinces in China 
have companies listed today on one of the two exchanges. If the quota system worked in 
bringing, on average, better than poorer performing companies to the market, we would 
expect that regions with higher levels of economic development are better represented 
than others. By contrast, if all provinces are equally represented, the quota system failed 
in screening companies on the basis of their (potential) economic value.
18 We use the 
number of listed firms in each region as a proxy for that regions representation. The 
firm’s capitalization broken down by region would be another useful indicator, but the 
data is currently not available to us. In addition, we use a province’s per capita GDP as a 
proxy for the region’s level of economic development.  To control for regions’ size, 
instead of using number of listed firms directly, we use the number of firms per million 
inhabitants.  
The results of this analysis do indeed indicate that economically stronger regions 
are better represented on the country’s stock exchanges. For example, the three largest 
cities in China, Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin have per capita GDP levels that are about 
                                                 
18 It was reported that in the first year when the quota system was implemented, 900 million out of 1 billion 
shares were issued by firms from Shanghai and Shenzhen, leaving little for other provinces (Fang, 1995). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press  36
200%, 300% and 150% respectively, higher than the national average. The umber of 
listed firms per million people from these regions was about 450%, 720%, and 130% 
higher than the national average.  Similarly, the number of firms per capita from the two 
of the best performing provinces Zhejiang and Jiangsu, with GDP per capita about 50% 
higher than the national average is about 6% to 40% higher than the national average. 
With regards to provinces with per capita GDP levels close to the national average, the 
average number of listed is roughly proportional to their per capital GDP levels. A high 
statistical correlation between average number of listed firms and per capita GDP across 
all of China’s regions (with a correlation coefficient of 0.85) confirms this observation.  
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that some regions are over-represented given 
their poor economic performance. This is the case for regions with a high concentration 
of ethnic minority groups. For example, the average number of listed firms in Ningxia, 
Qinghai, Tibet and Xinjiang was 90%, 80%, 200% and 40% higher than the national 
average respectively in year 2004, whereas the level of capita GDP in those regions is 
about 30% lower than the national average.  
This observation demonstrates an important drawback associated with the quota 
system, namely that political intervention may skew the distribution of firms in favor of 
poorer regions to the disadvantage of richer regions, which because of the quantitative 
constraint imposed by the quota system will get a smaller share. There is, however, a 
piece of good news, namely that investors have become increasingly capable of 
distinguishing good from bad companies. This is evidenced by the decreasing trend in the 
co-movement of stock. Moreover, market analysts have observed that the market is 
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becoming more and more segmented into “blue chip”, and other companies (Green and 
Ming, 2004). 
Our analysis of the quota system as an alternative governance device to allow ex 
ante law enforcement does not give an account on how markets were governed in the 
post-listing stage. To some extent, the checks and balances built into the quota system 
may have been at work. In fact, in a number of cases, firms had to be bailed out and 
quotas for regions were not increased [TBA]. In addition, the CSRC has used its 
enforcement powers to suspend listing, or to place under-performing firms under special 
surveillance. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that the quota system is ill-
suited for dealing with problems of continuous disclosure or market manipulation. 
Moreover, the CSRC is not well placed to use law enforcement mechanisms against 
companies that have the entire backing from the regional authorities, because even 
though it is a central government agency, it is not formally superior to provincial 
governments. In the public offering stage, this was less of a problem, because the CSRC 
could play regions off against each other and thus get leverage from the fact that regions 
were competing with each other. Yet, these governance devices are significantly weaker 
in the post listing world, and violations by firms that have been already listed have 
become rampant in recent years. 
Table 7 illustrates that more than 90% of all violations by firms listed in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were related to violation of continuous disclosure.  
Moreover, about 64% of the violations related to continuous disclosure (or about 59% of 
all violations) were related to violation of ad hoc information disclosure.  The reason for 
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this may be that companies have much more discretion in determining when an 
information is sufficiently important for it to be disclosed to the public.  
Table 8 illustrates the ineffectiveness of regional competition as a means to 
induce compliance with disclosure requirements post listing. This table contains 
information about the regional distribution of post listing disclosure violations on the two 
stock exchanges. The data show that the best performing regions, Northern China, 
Eastern China, and Southern China, are on opposite ends of the spectrum. The number of 
listed firms from Northern and Eastern China counted for more than 56% of all listed 
firms in the two stock exchanges, whereas their violations amounted to less than 31% of 
the total violations – far better than the national average. This seems to suggest that better 
performance is associated with greater compliance or less cheating. By contrast, the data 
on Southern China suggest the opposite. Only 15% of listed firms are located in the 






The relative success of the quota system in China during the early phases of stock 
market development does not imply that it will be superior to a disclosure system in the 
long term. Nor does it mean that it should be taken as a simple recipe for developing 
financial markets elsewhere. The effectiveness of the quota system depended heavily on 
                                                 
19 The fact that the Northern, Eastern, and Southern China are the best economic performing regions is 
supported by other sources of data, such as Chinese Statistic Yearbook (all the years since the mid 1990s). 
The fact that the Northern and Eastern China are among regions followed law best (or least corrupted), and 
Southern China is among regions that followed law worst (or most corrupted) is also supported by other 
sources of data, such as Xie and Lu (2003). 
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the availability of checks and balances within the existing system of state governance. 
Competition among regions and ministries for future quotas and the possible bail-out 
sanction were important parts of this system and have gone some way in ensuring that 
relevant state agents invested in the selection of more rather than less viable firms. 
However, the system has not been flawless, nor is it sustainable. There is evidence that 
once companies have made it to the market, the assets they represent are substituted for 
different assets in takeover transactions. Green (2003) asserts that by the late 1990s the 
most common route for private companies to gain access to financial markets was to take 
over moribund listed companies. This practice resembles similar practices in the early 
development of stock corporations in Europe, when only companies that had been 
chartered by the Crown could incorporate. Companies not officially chartered sought 
access to the market by buying up failing companies. Allegedly, this practice contributed 
to the major stock scandal of the eighteenth century, the South Sea Bubble (Davies, 
1997). The ex post substitution of assets undermines the efficacy of a governance system 
that relies on pre-screening of firms rather than continuous monitoring. Moreover, the 
quota system presumed that only state owned enterprises would be listed on exchanges 
and that therefore mechanisms that made use of existing governance structures over the 
state owned sector could be used for governing the emerging financial markets. With the 
growing importance of the non-state sector these assumptions no longer hold. In fact, 
recent years witnessed not only private companies taking over shells of listed companies, 
but also the renewed mushrooming of local exchanges.
20 Finally, the quota system may 
                                                 
20 South China Morning Post reported in April 2003 that representatives of 30 such exchanges met earlier 
that year to develop strategies aimed at expanding their presence in China’s capital markets. Estimates at 
the time suggested that over 3 million investor had bought shares in more than 1,000 companies outside of 
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have gone some way in governing the selection process of companies. However, it is not 
designed for, nor capable of ensuring effective monitoring of companies once they are 
listed. Many reported incidences of violations of investor rights take place after a 
company has been listed.  
In response to these challenges, the CSRC has strengthened its enforcement 
capacity and issued a host of new rules and regulations aimed at continuing and ad hoc 
disclosure.
21 The enforcement data discussed in Part III suggest that so far this had not 
had a strong impact. In fact, enforcement actions taken by the CSRC declined from 71 in 
2001 to 62 in 2002 and 51 in 2003. The same is true for enforcement activities at the 
stock exchanges. Whether private litigation may step in and fill the gap remains yet to be 
seen. So far, not a single case has been decided by the courts. Moreover, reactive ex post 
law enforcement may not be sufficient for governing financial markets (Pistor and Xu, 
2003). The major challenge China is currently facing is whether it can transform its 
governance structure and whether this transformation will keep pace with the 
transformation of the market. Unless China successfully manages this transition, her 
initial success in jumpstarting financial markets may not be worth much. If successful, 
however, the case of China could serve as an example that financial markets can take off 
even absent a developed legal system. More generally, our analytical framework suggests 
what the major problems are that any governance system must address.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the two major stock exchanges. The legality of these activities is questionable (Pissler, 2003), but the 
CSRC has not been very successful in curbing their activities. 
21 In 2001, Laura Cha, the former chairman of the Hong Kong securities regulator became deputy 
chairwoman of the CSRC and launched a campaign to enhance market transparency and enforce securities 
regulations. Her actions were criticized, however, as an outright attack on stock markets causing harm 
rather than benefiting investors. See her interview in Caijing, 20 January 2002, where she justifies her 
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Table 1: Civil Actions in Chinese Courts 
 







Beijing No. 1 Intermediate 




6/2002  ST Jiuzhou  3 Investors  Xiamen Intermediate 
People’s Court 
Rejected on procedural 
grounds 
11/2002  Jiabao Industrial  1 investor  Shanghai #2 Intermediate 
People’s Court 
Investor receives 
compensation in settlement 




Investors settle with individual 
underwriter through 
mediation; cases against 
company still pending 
12/2002 Jiabao  Industrial  24 
investors 
Shanghai #2 Intermediate 
People’s Court 
Pending 
09/2003 Daqing  Lianyi  381   
investors 
Harbin Intermediate Court 
(Heilongjiang Province) 
Suit originally brought in 2000 
and accepted; re-filed in 2003; 
pending as of 1/13/2004 
2003  Bohai Group  1 Investor  Jinan Intermediate People’s 
Court  
 
02/2003  Jinzhou Gang  1 investor  Shenyang Intermediate 
People’s Court 
Pending 









03/2003  Sanjiu Yiyao  3 investors  Shenzhen Intermediate 
People’s Court 
Pending 
03/2003  ST Tianyi  1 investor  Wuhan Intermediate 
People’s Court  
Pending 







Table 2: Ex post Regulatory Enforcement Activities 1998-2004 
 
YEAR  Total # of 
Enforcement 
Activities 
By CSRC  By Shanghai SE  By Shenzhen SE  By Other  
Enforcement
Agencies 
1998 3  3 0  0  0 
1999 12  10 1  1  0 
2000 16  11 2  3  0 
2001 71  23 20  27  1 
2002 62  11 24  24  4 
2003 51  15 19  15  2 
2004 9  8 1  0  0 
Totals   224  81  67  70  7 
Note: SE = stock exchange. 
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1998 3  0  0  0  0 
1999 9  1  1  1  0 
2000 7  0  1  8  0 
2001 9  1 14 46  0 
2002 8  6  7 40  1 
2003 11  0  6  34  0 
2004 8  0  0  1  0 
Totals   55 8  29  130  1 
 
 
Table 4: Shareholder structure in China 2001 
 
ShareHolder Structure  Shares  Ratio (%) 
State-owned Shares  56081639195  32.56   




Foreign Legal Person Shares  2016610078  1.17  
Private Placement of Legal Person Shares  10129159231  5.88  
Staff Shares  589558249  0.34  
Others after Share Reserve and Rights Issue  38221061  0.02  























Total Non-negotiable shares  104958796992  60.94   
A Shares  57027527883  33.11   
B Shares  7356569723  4.27  
Negotiable 
shares 
H and S Shares  2903117808  1.69  
Total Shares  172246012406  100.00  
 
 





Market Cap as % 
of GDP 
GNI per capita 
China nominal  524     
China adjusted  170  15  900 
Russia 76  25  1,800 
Poland   26  14*  4,350 
Hungary   10  34  4,820 
Czech Republic  9  25  5,260 
Source: [Green, 2003 #2371] using data from Standard & Poor; Worldbank world development indicators 
Note: China nominal refers to total stock market capitalization; China adjusted excludes non-negotiable 
shares. *Data for 2000 from PAJUSTE. 
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Table 6. Regional Distribution of Listed Firms 
        Growth rate of GDP/capita  
  Ave # of listed firms Ave # of listed firm# of listed firms1000 RMB  
Region   Year 2004  Year 1999Yr 1999-2004  Year 2001  
China 1.04779268  0.69209 0.513953 8.365492   
Anhui   0.64406836  0.288136 1.235294 5.220771   
Beijing 5.60092221  2.431979 1.30303 25.523   
Chongqin 0.91764879  0.655463 0.4 5.654  
Fujian    1.26107299  0.997127 0.264706 12.362   
Gansu   0.79604265  0.398021 1 4.163357   
Guangdon 1.65444398  1.325902 0.247788 13.72993   
Guangxi    0.50165846  0.228027 1.2 4.668   
Guizhou    0.39718909  0.226965 0.75 2.89529   
Hainan   2.91042441  2.64584 0.1 7.135   
Hebei    0.47987222  0.29992 0.6 8.362   
Heilongj   0.9382526  0.579509 0.619048 9.34891   
Henan    0.35073546  0.175368 1 5.923552   
Hubei    0.99144884  0.672169 0.475 7.81307   
Hunan    0.61636523  0.331889 0.857143 6.054   
Inner Mo   0.85750986  0.600257 0.428571 6.462522   
Jiangsu    1.10892707  0.547618 1.025 12.922   
Jiangxi   0.56934078  0.297047 0.916667 5.221   
Jilin 1.56703607  0.93276 0.68 7.640012   
Liaoling   1.36284044  1.147655 0.1875 12.04086   
Ningxia   2.00496027  1.275884 0.571429 5.34   
Qinghai   1.86607279  1.45139 0.285714 5.734566   
Shaanxi    0.50897677  0.508977 0 5.024   
Shandong 0.76690706  0.489042 0.568182 10.465  
Shanghai   8.83729588  7.374571 0.198347 37.382   
Shanxi    0.64672611  0.400354 0.615385 5.46   
Sichuan    0.76504315  0.631464 0.211538 5.25   
Tianjin   2.33532625  1.218431 0.916667 20.15444   
Tibet    3.05771942  1.52886 1 5.307   
Xinjiang   1.46266063  0.650071 1.25 7.913   
Yunnan    0.44853541  0.283286 0.583333 4.866   
Zhejiang   1.43694893  0.78379 0.833333 14.655   
Sources: For number of firms listed in each region, CSRC 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/statinfo ; for population and per capita GDP, NSB, Chinese 
Statistical Yearbook, 2002. 
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Others  Other Rehaznos  Other Reasons   11  4.4  4.40 
 Total    250  100  100 
 
Source: HE Jia et al., Chinese and Foreign Disclosure Systems Comparison and Their Effectiveness 
[Zhong-wai Xinxi Pilu Zhidu jiqi Shiji Xiaoguo Bijiao Yanjou], Table 3-5, Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Research Institute, 2002.   
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Table 8. Regional Distribution of Listed Companies Penalized For Disclosure Violations  
         
  Region  # Of Firms 
Fined 
% Of All Firms 
Being Fined 
Number of Firms 




  Northeast    31  14.22 10.51 +35.30 
 Northern 
China 
22  10.09 17.98 -43.87 
 Eastern 
China 
47  21.56 28.58 -24.56 
 Southern 
China 
62  28.44 15.38 +84.92 
 Central 
China 
25 11.47  9.99 +14.79 
  Northwest    6  2.75 6.69 -58.86 
  Southwest    25  11.47 10.86 +5.86 
    218  100 100 0   
Source: HE Jia et al., Chinese and Foreign Disclosure Systems Comparison and Their Effectiveness 
[Zhong-wai Xinxi Pilu Zhidu jiqi Shiji Xiaoguo Bijiao Yanjou], Table 3-11, Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Research Institute, 2002 
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